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Abstract
Whereas the dominant theoretical perspective in corporate governance research attends to
the conflicting interests between shareholders and executives, in practice executives must
frequently adjudicate between the demands of multiple principals with conflicting interests. To
investigate how executives cope with these conflicts, I examine how much firms claim they will
earn on the assets in their defined benefit (DB) pension plans. In a DB arrangement, participating
employees forgo wages in the present in order to receive post-retirement income and they rely on
executives to properly fund and manage plan assets for future payout. Executives, however, can
act opportunistically by increasing the amount they expect the firm to earn on plan assets,
effectively lowering their pension expenses and boosting the firm’s earnings. Whether executives
do so, I argue, is determined in part by the power and interests of employees and shareholders as
well as the decision-making schemas of the CEO. Through a detailed analysis, I show that equity
ownership by bank trusts and public pension funds and the presence of a CEO with a background
in finance are associated with higher expected rates, while higher rates of firm unionization are
associated with lower expected rates of return on such assets.
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Understanding the factors that influence executive decision-making is a core question of
management research, as scholars have long recognized that executives often confront
conflicting demands from various groups making claims on the firm’s resources (e.g., Barnard,
1938; Cyert & March, 1963; Selznick, 1948; Weber, 1978). An important dimension of this
claims-making process is that each stakeholder group has its own set of interests to be met across
different time horizons, allowing the firm to make promises of varying durations to the groups
based upon their preferences (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978: 96-100). One way firms do so is by
transferring obligations between the present and future. Accomplishing this conveyance across
periods requires the firm to anticipate future states based on the imperfect information available
at the present. When predictions about future states prove incorrect or when past promises
conflict with influential stakeholders’ expectations, keeping such promises can be challenging.
How executives manage these promises and thus adjudicate between the goals, interests,
and time horizons of various stakeholders is a fundamental question of corporate governance
(Davis, 2005). Researchers have predominantly studied corporate governance through the lens of
agency theory, which views corporations as a nexus of contracts between principals who seek to
achieve some outcome and agents, the party hired to provide the necessary assistance (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976). While enlightening, traditional agency theory focuses primarily on the
contracting arrangements between shareholders and executives and thus overlooks the
importance of other stakeholders, the commitments made to them by the firm, and their ability to
monitor and influence executive decision-making (Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel, & Jackson,
2008). In particular, in many organizational settings there exists more than one principal (Chang,
2003); however, how executives manage this complexity has not been fully examined. In
particular, in a context where executives must decide between the interests of two sets of
conflicting principals, what factors motivate them to favor one group over the other?
I attempt answer this question by investigating the amount firms claim they will earn on
the assets set aside to finance an explicit promise made to their workers: the defined benefit (DB)
2
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pension. We can think of DB pensions as a form of inside debt (cf. Sundaram & Yermack,
2007), whereby employees effectively forgo present wages in exchange for income in retirement
(Kruse, 1995). To finance a DB plan, the firm must reserve enough funds to cover the future
liabilities owed to workers. While there are several assumptions firms must make to do so, the
expected rate of return (ERR) on pension assets is one of the most impactful on a firm’s pension
expenses and one that executives maintain latitude in setting. In practice, firms invest the funds
they set aside to meet their future pension obligations and estimate a return on those investments.
These estimates, rather than actual returns, determine the firm’s pension costs. Aggressive
expectations, while boosting earnings in the present, compromise the long-term health of the
firm’s pension fund if not matched over time by actual returns (Waring, 2012). Manipulating
pension assumptions, therefore, is commonly seen as a form of earnings management (Comprix
& Muller, 2011), that is, one of a set of practices executives can use to influence financial
reporting in a way that is advantageous to the firm and/or its decision-makers.
Workers, therefore, entrust executives to properly finance and manage DB plans in
exchange for work done in the present. Hence, we can consider DB participants to be principals
with a claim on a portion of the firm’s assets. Increasing the ERR transfers funds that would have
gone toward the firm’s DB plan to its reported earnings, and executives have the scope to act
opportunistically by doing so (Eaton, Nofsinger, & Varma, 2014). Importantly, executives are
also agents to investors (Fama, 1980)—many of whom have a shorter time horizon than
workers—and the pressures executives face to appease investors may prompt executives to find
ways to boost current earnings. As such, ERRs are an appealing context to assess principal-agent
conflicts as executives have the discretion to allocate the firm’s rewards between two
principals—employees and investors—with different interests, sources of influence, and time
horizons.
Incorporating insights from socio-political theories of the firm (e.g., Cyert & March,
1963), power-dependence perspectives (e.g., Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), and stakeholder theory
3

(e.g., Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997), I develop a simple theoretical framework to examine how
executives adjudicate between two principals. My core argument is that because complex
organizations have multiple goals that often conflict, which goals executives prioritize depend, in
part, upon the saliency of stakeholder interests (Agle, Mitchell, & Sonnenfeld, 1999). Because
executives have discretion in setting the ERR, I expect that their willingness to boost earnings by
increasing it is guided by the power and interests of employees and shareholders as well as the
decision-making schema of the firm’s chief executive officer (CEO).
Through a detailed analysis of a large sample of large US employers from 1992 to 2006, I
find evidence that each of these three factors affects the propensity for CEOs to change the ERR
on pension assets. In so doing, I make three main advances to existing research. First, I provide a
more complete depiction of the governance process, whereby employees are also principals,
shareholders have diverse interests, and executives rely on their own decision-making schemas
to adjudicate between the two groups. By showing that power dynamics and CEO schemas help
determine how conflicts between two principals are managed, this study complements and
extends literature attending to the complexity associated with managing multiple stakeholders
(e.g., Arthurs, Hoskisson, Busenitz, & Johnson, 2008; Coff, 1999; Kacperczyk, 2009).
Second, this study builds on the recent work examining how firms’ equity ownership
structures and overall power dynamics affect employment-related outcomes. Unlike layoffs
(Jung, 2014) or retirement plan participation (Cobb, 2015), however, with ERRs the operational
and financial impetus for the change can be at least somewhat separated. This distinction is
important because the tradeoff between providing additional funds to a pension plan or to firm
earnings is direct and immediate, allowing for a cleaner test of how executives adjudicate
between opposing stakeholders. Similarly, this study expands upon the recent work by Cobb
(2015), who found that the desire to minimize the financial uncertainty that accompanies DB
plans was a factor in firms decreasing the size of their plans. In this study, I show how firm
ownership structure and a CEO’s background help create that uncertainty and how employee
4

power mitigates it. Lastly, this paper also makes an important contribution to the study of
pensions as it is, to my knowledge, the first to show that employees, investors having different
legal forms, and a CEO’s background play a key role in how firms set their ERRs.
PENSION ASSUMPTIONS AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT
To examine more fully how stakeholder contestation affects a firm’s pension decisions, I
first provide a brief overview of how firms design and account for DB plans. Firms structure
their DB pensions to provide each participant a fixed, annuitized source of post-retirement
income. The rate of income is determined using a formula based on the worker’s length of
service and wage around the time of retirement. Take this simple benefit formula:
𝑋𝑋 = 𝑏𝑏 ∗ 𝑊𝑊𝑓𝑓 ∗ 𝑆𝑆

where b is the benefit percentage (typically between 1 and 2.5%), Wf is the “final wage” based
on the last year or the average of the last years of employment, and S is the number of years of
service in the firm. Estimating the future liability for a workforce necessitates developing
predictions about the number of individuals who will retire n years in the future, their expected
wage rate at that time, and how many years of service they will have accumulated (Orr, 1998).
The firm commits to pay the cost of these promised benefits and thus incurs a liability equal to
the present value of all future payments owed to its workers. The firm funds this liability with
pension assets, investing them in financial vehicles such as debt, equities, and insurance assets.
There are three key calculations required to determine the annual cost of DB plans. The
first is service cost, which represents the increase in the pension obligation related to workers
who have accrued another year of service. Firms also calculate interest cost, which is the interest
accrued on the pension liability arising from the passage of time. The last factor is the ERR on
plan assets, which is an estimate of how much the firm’s pension assets will earn—a value that
offsets the service and interest costs. Under Accounting Standards Codification 715, employers
have discretion in choosing their pension ERRs. Accounting rules allow for the use of the
expected, as opposed to the actual, rate of return in order to insulate firm earnings from year-to5

year market swings. Over time, firms must reconcile the difference between the expected and
actual returns, but this occurs over long amortization periods. 2 Thus, by increasing its ERR, an
employer can decrease reported pension expenses and shift its obligations to its employees
further into the future. Doing so allows an executive to boost a firm’s market value, as evidence
shows that earnings associated with changed pension assumptions are capitalized into the share
price in a manner similar to operating earnings (Coronado & Sharpe, 2003; Picconi, 2006).
To illustrate the impact of ERR increases on firm earnings, take the following example of
IBM Inc. 3 In 1997, the firm increased its ERR from 9.25 to 9.5%, which accounted for about
1.5% of its pretax income between 1997 and 1999. Despite poor equity market returns and
declining bond yields, IBM raised the ERR again to 10% in 2000. As a result, its pretax income
in 2000 and 2001 income was nearly 5% greater than it would have been with an ERR of 9.25%.
Between 1995 and 2001, IBM’s pretax income grew at an annual compound rate of 6.7%. Were
it not for the two ERR increases, it would have grown at a rate of only 5.6%.
To be clear, when a company like IBM states that it expects to earn a 10% return on its
pension assets, it is claiming that, on average over time, the funds the firm set aside and invested
to meet its liabilities will earn 10% in returns. Taking into account dividends and inflation,
between 1870 and 2010, the S&P 500’s real return averaged around 6.5% per year. Coupling this
with the fact that firms invest large portions of their pension assets in corporate and government
bonds, which typically yield lower—though less volatile—returns, one might reasonably
conclude than an expected return of 10% is overly optimistic.4 In fact, legendary investor Warren
Buffet once critiqued the propensity of firms to use overly optimistic assumptions, stating, “I
2

Deviations between actual and expected returns are entered as an off-balance-sheet, unrecognized gain or loss. The
rules governing reconciliation between the actual and expected return rate are based on the corridor approach,
whereby the accumulated unexpected gains or losses are compared to the beginning pension benefit obligation
balance and the market value of the plan assets. Any amount greater than 10% of the larger of the two is amortized
over the remaining service lives of the firm’s employees (see Bergstresser, et al., 2006, for more detail).
3
This example was taken from Bergstresser, et al., (2006: 158-159).
4
Prior research has found that firms hold, on average, about 26% of their assets in corporate equity and about 31%
in government debt and cash, 23% in insurance assets, and 21% in other types of assets, such as real estate,
corporate bonds, and private equity (Rauh, 2009).
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invite you to ask the CFO of a company having a large defined-benefit pension fund what
adjustment would need to be made to the company’s earnings if its pension assumptions were
lowered to 6.5 percent” (Buffett & Loomis, 2001).
Researchers and commentators commonly view the manipulation of pension assumptions
as a form of earnings management (An, Lee, & Zhang, 2014; Revell & Tkaczyk, 2002).
Examining this type of earnings management is useful for the study of executive decisionmaking for several reasons. First, executives have substantial discretion when setting the ERR
and changes to the rate reflect a conscious managerial choice. Second, unlike discretionary
accruals and real activities manipulations, ERRs are directly observable and largely unrelated to
other dimensions of a firm’s performance that complicate analyses of these other forms of
earnings management (Bergstresser et al., 2006). Finally, because ERRs are directly related to
labor costs, aggressive ERR assumptions represent a transfer of assets from one stakeholder
group (i.e., employees) to the firm’s earnings, which potentially benefits other stakeholders (e.g.,
shareholders, executives) (Comprix & Muller, 2011). Unlike in other contexts where we see this
tradeoff, such as layoffs (Jung, 2014) and employee benefit changes (Cobb, 2015), the ERR
transfer is largely unrelated to the operational strategy or performance of the firm. 5
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, STAKEHOLDER POWER,
AND PENSION RETURN ASSUMPTIONS
Corporate governance concerns “the structure of rights and responsibilities among the
parties with a stake in the firm” (Aoki, 2001: 11). While in practice corporate governance
involves balancing the interests of various stakeholders, including shareholders, management,
and labor (Aguilera et al., 2008; Blair & Roe, 1999), the primary focus of most governance
research is on the methods shareholders use to discipline management. The core problem
motivating most of this work is that because the actions and interests of executives often conflict

5

Executives could use the extra earnings generated from an ERR increase to finance its strategic endeavors (see
Bergstresser et al., 2006).
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with those of shareholders, shareholders rely on various internal and external control
mechanisms to monitor and incentivize executives to act in accordance with their demands
(Dalton, Hitt, Certo, & Dalton, 2007; Walsh & Seward, 1990).
While greatly informing our understanding of governance problems and potential
solutions, an agency-theoretic focus may overlook some issues confronting executive decisionmakers. First, because of its focus on the bilateral contracts between shareholders and executives,
agency theory typically overlooks other stakeholder claims on the firm’s resources. In particular,
in many organizational settings there are multiple sets of residual claimants to whom an
executive is responsible (Kiser, 1999). 6 Goal conflicts, therefore, do not occur simply between
the agent and the principal. Rather, goal conflicts occur also in situations where an agent must
“maneuver through the tangled loyalties he or she owes to many different principals and how to
negotiate through their competing interests…” (Shapiro, 2005: 278). How do agents resolve
these often-irreconcilable conflicts between multiple principals?
Prior research has recognized the issue of multiple principals (e.g., Bernheim &
Whinston, 1986; Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & Grossman, 2002), though most organizational
research on the topic has examined conflicts between different types of shareholders (see Peng &
Sauerwald, 2013). In this line of inquiry, researchers emphasize that principal-principal conflicts
are resolved by various external (e.g., laws) and internal (e.g., voting rights) governance
mechanisms. In a notable exception, Adams (1996) examined the issue of multiple principals in a
comparative study of the Dutch and English East India Companies, focusing primarily on how
their organizational structures affected resource dependencies, thereby affecting relationships
between principals and between principals and agents.
In contrast, management scholarship has long advanced the idea that executives often
face a number of conflicting demands from stakeholders (e.g., Barnard, 1938; Simon, 1947). A
6
Numerous scholars have asserted that viewing shareholders as the sole residual claimant is not justified in the law
(e.g., Blair & Stout, 1999; Dodd, 1932) and does not reflect organizational realities (e.g., Asher, Mahoney, &
Mahoney, 2005; Freeman, 1984).
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negotiation process that occurs between coalitions, which consist of groups of individuals with
similar interests seeking to have their preferences met by the firm, helps determine a firm’s goals
and strategies (March, 1962). Coalitions often have divergent interests, and, in most cases, no
single group is able to determine the goals pursued by the organization. However, what issues
executives attend to and whose interests are prioritized is determined, in part, by the power and
influence of the actors (Emerson, 1962; Jackall, 1988). Stakeholder theorists have also argued
that, when making decisions, executives weigh the interests of various stakeholders based on
their power, legitimacy, and the urgency of their demands (Mitchell et al., 1997). Therefore, the
relative power of different stakeholders and changes thereto help determine the outcome of these
conflicts and should be reflected in the firm’s goals and strategies.
We see stakeholder conflict clearly in the context of DB pensions. While it is well
established that executives are agents to shareholders (Fama, 1980) in a DB framework,
employees are also principals. Pension theory argues that workers effectively forego income in
the present period, trusting that the firm will manage and appropriately fund the plan and keep its
promise to pay out the funds as a post-retirement annuity (Kruse, 1995). However, the firm, not
the worker, owns the pension assets and liabilities (Landsman, 1986). Thus, as Shleifer and
Summers (1988) argued, ex ante risk sharing between the firm and DB participants can lead to ex
post opportunistic appropriation because the property rights held by pension participants are
poorly defined (see also Asher et al., 2005). In sum, since workers entrust the firm with their
foregone wages and because executives can use excess pension assets for their own ends
(Ippolito & James, 1992), in a DB arrangement the employee-executive relationship represents a
context rife with potential principal-agent conflicts (Eaton et al., 2014).
Prior research has focused chiefly on the executives’ incentives to adjust ERRs for their
own gain, finding, for example, that ERR increases occur when stock-based CEO compensation
is higher (Bergstresser et al., 2006) and when the firm is likely to miss analyst estimates (An et
al., 2014). Because executives are also agents to shareholders who expect that the firm will
9

generate adequate returns to provide them with profit potential, executives may be inclined to
manipulate the rate to benefit shareholders. In the sections below, however, I argue that
employees have the ability to mitigate such manipulations and that CEOs may use their
discretion to act opportunistically in order to appease investors. I also argue that the background
of the CEO plays a role in determining how firms set their ERRs.
Employee Power
Though the corporate governance literature frequently neglects consideration of labor
(Blair & Roe, 1999), employees can play a key role in the governance process due to their ability
to influence corporate decision-making and control resources (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Coff,
1999). In a DB arrangement, firms invest workers’ foregone wages to provide them an
annuitized income in retirement (Ippolito, 1987). Because compensation tends to spike upward in
a DB plan as the worker nears retirement (Kotlikoff & Wise, 1985), she has a financial incentive to
remain in the firm until her benefits have fully vested. Since the firm owns the pension assets,
workers’ willingness to accept a DB pension necessitates that the explicit terms of the plan be
matched with an implicit promise of lifetime employment (Lazear, 1986). We can therefore
consider DB pensions to be both an incomplete contract that confers to workers a residual claim
on a portion of the firm’s assets and an implicit promise of lifetime employment in exchange for
effort and loyalty (Gustman, Mitchell, & Steinmeier, 1994).
By increasing the ERR, executives effectively push out pension costs, thereby increasing
the amount of funds necessary in the future to match the obligations owed to workers. In so
doing, the firm increases the probability that it will, in the future, fully renege on its pension
promise by terminating or freezing its plan (Waring, 2012). Consequently, workers can be
negatively affected by higher ERRs. Research has found that worker power influences key
elements of the employment relationship, such as the amount of employment security and
stability (Bidwell, 2013; Dencker, 2009). As such, I expect that as workers in a firm obtain (lose)
power, the firm’s ERRs will be lower or higher.
10

Individual employees have little power to influence an organization’s goals and
strategies, but when workers mobilize and act collectively, their power is greater (Coff, 1999).
The primary means by which employees do so is via unionization, which provides workers an
institutionalized apparatus to exert influence on firms by engaging in or threatening strikes and
slowdowns and by expressing demands through collective bargaining. Evidence has shown that
unions play a crucial role in how much discretion firms have in structuring their employment
relationships. For example, unions have been shown to deter the use of contingent employment
relationships (Gramm & Schnell, 2001) and are associated with longer employment tenure
(Bidwell, 2013) and improved benefits and wages (Freeman & Medoff, 1984). Though DB
pensions present a case where younger workers may have interests that conflict with those of
older employees (Dencker, Joshi, & Martocchio, 2009), in a union setting the interests of the
average worker predominate. Because the average worker is likely to be older and have higher
exit costs, when workers bargain collectively they tend to seek more security (Goldberg, 1980),
which DB pensions are designed to create (Cobb, 2015).
Labor organizations have also served as important monitors of firms’ employment and
corporate governance practices, and anecdotal evidence suggests that unions have been
outspoken against firms’ aggressive ERR assumptions (Solomon & Hawkins, 2005). Moreover,
firms may be prone to decrease their ERRs prior to labor negotiations to make the plan appear
more costly and use this a lever when seeking wage and/or benefit concessions (Benmelech,
Bergman, & Enriquez, 2012). As such, I expect that when workers have greater levels of power
in a firm, its executives will use less-aggressive ERR assumptions.
Hypothesis 1: A firm’s level of unionization will be negatively related to its expected rate of
return on pension assets.
Shareholder Power and Fiduciary Standards
Shareholders invest in corporations primarily for economic gain, which comes in the
form of dividends or by selling part of their interest in the firm for profit. Shareholders, then,
11

make the decision to invest based on the belief that, in the future, the firm will (a) distribute
some of its returns and/or (b) the value of the firm’s shares will increase, allowing them to profit
when selling shares (Velasco, 2006). Firms respond to investor pressures because of their ability
to initiate and engage in various forms of activism (Filatotchev & Toms, 2006) and because the
liquidation of their shareholdings reduces the value of the company, which raises the cost of
capital (David, O'Brien, Yoshikawa, & Delios, 2010; Parrino, Sias, & Starks, 2003). Extensive
research has examined how investors influence executive decision-making in order to enhance
shareholder returns (e.g., Connelly, Tihanyi, Certo, & Hitt, 2010; Useem, 1996). A key finding
from this work is that the structure of equity ownership helps shape the political dynamics within
a firm and directly affects its goals and structure (Fiss & Zajac, 2004).
There are, however, different types of shareholders with different goals, objectives, and
time horizons (see Connelly, Hoskisson, Tihanyi, & Certo, 2010). In this study, I focus on
institutional investors. This is the largest class of equity owners in the United States, and a
category that receives considerable scholarly interest (e.g., Hoskisson et al., 2002; Jung &
Dobbin, 2014). Notably, in the context of earnings management, some research has argued that
due to their ability and willingness to monitor management, institutional investors discourage
accruals management (e.g., Chung, Firth, & Kim, 2002; Hadani, Goranova, & Khan, 2011) and
ERR increases (Eaton et al., 2014). Others have found, however, a more complex relationship
between institutional shareholding and earnings management, such as when current shareholders
benefit from earnings management at the expense of future shareholders (Guthrie &
Sokolowsky, 2010) or when shareholders have a shorter investment horizon (Koh, 2007).
As these studies reveal, there are many types of institutional investors—public and
company pension funds, banks, insurance companies, and mutual funds, for example—that differ
along a number of attributes. One point of differentiation between them is the stringency of their
fiduciary responsibilities to clients. Though all institutional investors have discretion over how
they invest their clients’ assets and are legally considered fiduciaries, the strictness of the
12

standards of prudence differs based on the investors’ legal form (David, Kochhar, & Levitas,
1998). Prudent-man laws are designed to protect clients by allowing them to seek damages when
a fiduciary fails to invest in the clients’ best interest. Though institutions typically own a diverse
array of stocks, court rulings stipulate that the merits of each stock in the portfolio be assessed
individually to determine prudence (Badrinath, Gay, & Kale, 1989). As a result, investors held to
stricter fiduciary standards have a strong incentive to protect themselves from liability by tilting
their portfolios toward firms with better current-earnings performance, which the courts often
use to determine the prudence of an investment (Del Guercio, 1996).
Not surprisingly, research has shown that institutional investors with stricter fiduciary
standards are more sensitive to the short-term earnings performance of the individual stocks in
their portfolio (e.g., Bushee, 2001). Since the benefit of increasing the ERR is an immediate
enhancement of current-year earnings, I expect that the stringency of fiduciary standards will
play a key role in how executives set the ERR. While I do not necessarily expect that
shareholders specifically request that a firm raise its ERR, when shareholders value near-term
returns and directly or indirectly pressure firms to provide it, I expect that manipulating their
pension assumptions is a tactic firms will be more apt to use.
To test the impact of fiduciary restrictions on ERRs, I split institutions into five groups
based on their legal form — investment advisors (including mutual funds), insurance companies,
bank trusts, public pension funds, and company pension funds — as prior research has found
significant differences across these classifications for preferences for current earnings
(Abarbanell, Bushee, & Raedy, 2003). Investment advisors primarily manage individual
investments through mutual funds. While the Model Prudent Investment Act of 1940 imposes a
fiduciary responsibility on mutual fund managers, it makes no reference to prudent investments.
Therefore these managers are held to the least-restrictive fiduciary responsibilities among
institutional investors, granting them great latitude in selecting firms in which to invest (Del
Guercio, 1996). Insurance companies hold equities as an investment vehicle for their premiums.
13

Compared to mutual funds, insurance companies are subject to stricter fiduciary constraints;
however, these restraints are still relaxed when compared to those for banks and pension funds.
The three types of institutions with the most stringent fiduciary standards are bank trusts,
public pension funds, and company pension funds. Bank trusts manage equities on behalf of
other institutions, including pension funds and endowments, and face particularly strict fiduciary
requirements that motivate them to avoid investments the courts would deem imprudent
(Badrinath et al., 1989). Because current-earnings performance is the key criteria used to
determine the prudence of an investment, banks should find firms with better near-term earnings
performance to be safer, and thus more attractive, investments. In fact, Del Guercio (1996) found
that bank trust managers invest more heavily in stocks with a better Standard & Poor’s Earnings
and Dividend Ranking — a measure often used in courts to defend a stock investment as prudent
— while mutual fund managers do not. Similarly, Bushee (2001) found that equity ownership by
bank trusts is associated with a preference for near-term earnings over long-run value. Therefore,
firms with a higher percentage of bank ownership may feel heightened pressure to continue solid
earnings performance given the risk of such investors liquidating their holdings.
Public pension funds, as retirement vehicles for public-sector workers, also face strict
fiduciary responsibilities under the state and local laws governing their investment operations
(Shin & Seo, 2011). Research has found that the fear of litigation is a particularly strong
motivating investment criterion for public pension managers (O'Barr & Conley, 1992). Similarly,
under the Employment Retirement Investment Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), managers of
company pension funds are personally liable for losses on imprudent investments. Thus both
public and company pension fund managers have a strong incentive to invest in safe, highquality stocks (Bushee, 2001; Del Guercio, 1996). In sum, based on their more stringent
fiduciary standards, we should expect that as the percentage of a firm’s shares owned by public
or company pension funds increases, the firm will be more willing to increase its ERR to
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maintain or improve earnings. Doing so makes the firm a more attractive investment and lowers
the probability that these investors will liquidate their holdings.
Nevertheless, prior research has contended that pension funds are a more patient form of
capital with a longer-term investment horizon (Tihanyi, Johnson, Hoskisson, & Hitt, 2003), and
ownership by these funds is associated with firms that are more socially responsible (Johnson &
Greening, 1999). Pension funds also prefer CEO pay to be tied less closely to firm performance
as such linkages might encourage unnecessary risk taking and earnings management (Shin &
Seo, 2011). It is also possible that pension fund managers hold a more conservative view toward
earnings garnered from pension changes. These managers may be better informed about the
impact of ERR increases and are thus more effective monitors of firms’ pension plans. The study
of pension manipulations, therefore, presents a unique context to examine how pension fund
ownership affects executive decision-making.
More generally, one might expect investors to discount any returns garnered through
ERR increases. A number of studies have found, however, that investors do not effectively
assess the impact of pension accounting on firm value. For example, Coronado and Sharpe
(2003) found that earnings due to changed pension assumptions were capitalized into share
prices in a manner equivalent to operating earnings (see also Picconi, 2006). In a related vein,
Franzoni and Marin (2006) found that firms with underfunded pension plans are overvalued by
the market, as investors do not anticipate the impact of pension liabilities on future earnings. The
accounting literature surmises that the complexity of pension accounting, where much of the
pertinent information is embedded in footnotes, makes it challenging for investors to effectively
value plan changes (Coronado, Mitchell, Sharpe, & Nesbitt, 2008; Picconi, 2006). It is also
plausible that investors that place greater value on firms with better current earnings performance
are relatively indifferent to earnings generated from pension changes versus operations.
Despite their transitory impact on reported income and the often arbitrary nature in which
these assumptions are set, higher ERRs are associated with increased earnings and share prices,
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providing such shareholders with greater profit potential—at least in short-run (Coronado &
Sharpe, 2003). Based on the stringency of fiduciary standards for banks, public pension funds,
and company pension funds, I expect that firms with higher levels of ownership by these
institutions will be more compelled to increase their ERRs.
Hypothesis 2: A firm’s level of institutional ownership by (a) bank trusts, (b) public pension
funds, and (c) company pension funds will be positively related to its expected rate of return on
pension assets.
Though I do not hypothesize a relationship between insurance companies and investment
advisors on the one hand and ERR changes on the other, I control for these investor types in my
analyses. These controls can be viewed as a benchmark to test whether fiduciary standards are a
determinant of institutional investor preferences for near-term earnings (Bushee, 2001).
CEO Background and Decision-Making
Equity owners of large corporations typically delegate control over firm resources to
management. While constraints on their discretion exist, by the nature of their position top
executives have substantial authority to set firms’ goals and strategies (Fligstein, 1991; Graffin,
Boivie, & Carpenter, 2013). Thus, while complex organizations are composed of stakeholder
groups with competing interests vying for resources and attention, the arbiters of much of this
conflict in modern corporations are executive decision-makers (Longo, 2000).
The literature on earnings management has focused considerable attention on CEO
incentives to manage earnings, finding, for example, that CEOs are more willing to manage
accruals when they receive greater levels of performance-based compensation (Zhang, Bartol,
Smith, Pfarrer, & Khanin, 2008) or in order to secure permanent employment (Chen, Luo, Tang,
& Tong, 2015). Similarly, prior research on pension-assumption manipulations has focused on
CEO incentives to manipulate the ERR, finding that ERR increases occur when stock-based
CEO compensation is higher (Bergstresser et al., 2006) and when the firm is likely to miss
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analyst estimates (An et al., 2014). In this study, I complement and extend this prior work by
examining how the background of CEOs affects their willingness to change the ERR.
When faced with similar circumstances, different executives may make substantially
different decisions based on their individual understanding of those situations. As such, firmlevel characteristics and outcomes can be linked, in part, to the experiences and schemas of
senior executives (see Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009). Executive beliefs about the
most effective tactics and strategies are likely to emerge from prior experience (Skinner, 1953),
as prior training and experience have an enduring effect on an individual’s cognition and
decision-making schemas (Dearborn & Simon, 1958; Prahalad & Bettis, 1986). The functional
background of a firm’s top executive, therefore, is likely to play a role in determining how
conflicts between various stakeholders are resolved and hence in setting the objectives and
strategies of the firm (Fligstein, 1990; Ocasio & Kim, 1999).
CEOs with a background in finance are of particular interest to the study of ERRs, as
there are at least two explanations for why such CEOs might be more likely than others to
manipulate this rate. First, training and early career experience in finance are thought to affect
CEOs’ commitment to the primacy of markets and the belief that shareholders are the sole
stakeholder to whom the firm is beholden (Fiss & Zajac, 2004). A shareholder primacy view
may encourage a shorter investment time horizon and provide a justification for maximizing
rents to equity holders by reducing rents to labor and other stakeholders (Goldstein, 2012).
Because finance CEOs tend to hold such a view, they are thought to view labor as a cost to be
minimized (Fligstein & Shin, 2007), and research has found that CEOs with a background in
finance are more likely to engage in downsizing (Budros, 2000; Jung, 2014). Hence, theory
suggests that executives with a background in finance will hold a positive view toward
minimizing a firm’s long-term obligations to its workers as the demands and concerns of workers
are likely to be viewed as less salient (Bundy, Shropshire, & Buchholtz, 2013).
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Second, evidence suggests also that CEOs with a background in finance are more
financially sophisticated—more specifically, they have been found to be better able to raise
external capital, less likely to hold cash, more likely to issue debt, and are thought to follow more
aggressive financial policies (Custodio & Metzger, 2014). Thus, in addition to their proclivity to
put the interests of shareholders ahead of those of other stakeholders, one might expect CEOs
with a background in finance to have a greater awareness and understanding of the consequences
of raising a firm’s ERR and to see this as a way to manage earnings without the risk of
impropriety. Altogether, given their predisposition toward a market orientation and attention to
financial measures of performance, as well as their greater knowledge and understanding of
financial instruments, I expect that when a firm has a finance CEO, its ERR will be higher.
Hypothesis 3: Compared to firms with CEOs that have other functional backgrounds, the
presence of a CEO with a background in finance will be positively related to its expected rate of
return on pension assets.
DATA AND METHODS
Sample
Because my central interest is examining the drivers of firms’ ERRs, I focused my
analysis on large US firms that had a DB plan during the period of study. Though it is also
important to understand trends in the retirement plan use of all firms, I focused on larger firms
during this period because they were most likely to have DB pensions and were most subject to
changes in the competitive and ideological landscape that might motivate their use of pension
assumptions as a form of earnings management.
The common practice among researchers of drawing their samples from a single year
when studying large firms can create survivorship bias. Because this study covers a long period
that saw a great deal of turnover among the largest firms (Davis & Stout, 1992), I wanted to
capture the relevant dynamics by sampling from multiple points in time. I originally began my
analysis by examining the years 1986 to 2006—a choice motivated by the fact that new Financial
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Accounting Standards Board (FASB) guidelines were passed in 1985, making 1986 the first year
in which a change in pension assumptions under the new guidelines could have occurred. The
initial sample included all publicly traded firms that had a DB plan and were included on the
1986 Fortune 500 list of largest industrials, the 1995 Fortune 1000 list, or the Fortune 500 list for
2007. This selection generated an unbalanced sample of 938 firms. However, because some of
the CEO data were available from only 1992 onward, the primary analyses I present here use
data for 1992 to 2006 only, yielding an unbalanced sample of 728 firms. I did run, however,
models without the CEO variables for the full complement of years and discuss those results
below. These analyses are available upon request.
Variables
Expected rate of return. My dependent variable is the expected rate of return on pension
assets. The ERR data come from two sources: Form 5500 reports and Compustat. Each year,
firms offering retirement plans to their workers must submit a Form 5500 report that details
information about the plan. I had a small number of instances in which the ERRs for a firm’s
different plans were not the same. In these instances, I used the rate of the largest plan. One of
the challenges with using the Form 5500 is missing data, that is, there are a number of
observations each year for which the ERR is not available. I therefore supplemented these data
with data from Compustat, which has information on firm ERRs beginning in 1991. For ease of
interpretation, I multiplied the ERR by 100 and presented the ERR in basis points.
Unionization. I included a measure of employee power, unionization, which is the
percentage of a firm’s DB participants covered by collectively bargained plans. These data come
from the Form 5500 reports, which include a field indicating whether a pension plan is part of a
collective bargaining agreement. Unions often stipulate that some firm decisions, particularly
those directly affecting employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement, require union
participation (Freeman & Medoff, 1984). Collectively bargained plans, therefore, limit the ability
of firms to modify the plan’s terms unilaterally. I note here that in some cases workers in a firm
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may be represented by a union but are not participants in a collectively bargained plan. In other
instances, not all workers participating in a collectively bargained plan may be part of the union,
as if any part of a pension plan is covered in a collectively bargained agreement then it is
considered a unionized plan. Given these potential issues, I also used the rate of unionization in
the firm’s focal industry and the results are similar to those presented below.
Institutional share ownership. For each firm in each year, I took the percentage of the
total number of shares outstanding for the focal firm owned by institutional investors as
classified in each of the different types: Bank, Public Pension, Company Pension, Insurance
Company, and Investment Advisor. 7 Unlike measures of overall institutional share ownership,
these measures have the advantage of assuming that institutional investors’ interests, and their
influence on firm strategies, vary based upon fiduciary standards. The data come from Bushee
(1998) and are lagged one year.
CEO background. The functional background of CEOs was coded manually based on
their prior work experience. I coded individuals who served in an accounting or finance-related
position — such as chief financial officer, controller, or treasurer — as a Finance CEO. Because
the ERR is typically set early in the fiscal year (Picconi, 2006), I considered the CEO of record
to be the individual working at the end of quarter one of each fiscal year. In the analyses below, I
compared finance CEOs with all other CEO background types. 8 The information was collected
from Who’s Who in Finance and Industry and supplemented with information from the Dun &
Bradstreet Reference Book of Corporate Management and company proxy filings.
Control variables. A firm’s ERR may relate to factors not included in the discussion of
the hypotheses. To account for firm size, I included the lagged log of Total Assets. I included a
7

There are two other categories of institutional investors: foundations (including universities) and miscellaneous.
Including these does not materially affect the results.
8
I also coded four additional CEO background categories: (1) General Management (including operations), (2)
Sales and Marketing, (3) Engineering and other technical jobs (e.g., chief information officer), and (4) Law. In
analyses not presented here, I found that, in comparison to all other CEOs, those with a background in law are
significantly and negatively associated with ERRs. The other CEO background types had no significant effect on
ERRs and were not significantly different from one another with respect to ERRs.
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measure of Revenue Growth, a common control in studies of earnings management as it may be
related to the ability of firms to finance their DB plans. To account for performance, I took the
company’s previous-year Return on Equity (ROE). Analyses using return on assets yield similar
results. Because this variable has some extreme values, I winsorized this figure at the 99th and 1st
percentiles. The employment and financial data come from Compustat. I included a measure of
Long-term Debt to Total Assets, lagged one year, as a measure of the firm’s relative covenant
constraints. I also winsorized this figure at the 99th percentile as it contained some extreme
values at the upper end. The employment and financial data come from Compustat.
The size of a firm’s pension plan or plans may make it more willing to increase the ERR
of its pension assets; therefore I also controlled for the size of the firm’s DB pension plan(s)
using the log total of all of the assets the firm has in its DB plan(s) (DB Assets). I also included a
measure of the Funding Status of the firms’ pension plan or plans from the previous year.
Calculated as the ratio of the fair market value of the firm’s pension assets to its projected benefit
obligations multiplied by 100, the ratio represents whether the firm’s pension plans are
adequately funded. Executives of firms with a higher funding status ratio may be inclined to raise
the ERR. Pension-participation, asset, and liability data were taken from the Form 5500 filings
and Compustat and the operating asset data from Compustat.
To account for the possibility that other governance mechanisms may affect the
relationship between the independent variables and ERR increases, I included several control
variables. First, I include a measure of Shareholder Rights, which measures the number of
practices the firm adopted that grant (or restrict) shareholder rights. I used the governance index
(Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003) obtained from the Investor Responsibility Research Center
(IRRC) governance database and reverse-coded it such that higher values equal greater
shareholder rights. I also included a control measure for CEO Tenure, as a CEO might use
different decision-making criteria as she becomes more experienced. Prior research has also
shown that CEOs who are more entrenched have greater influence and may be monitored less
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rigorously than their less-tenured counterparts (Dikolli, Mayew, & Nanda, 2014). Prior work has
also found a positive relationship between option-based executive compensation and higher
ERRs (Bergstresser et al., 2006). Hence, I included the ratio of stock-option pay to total pay
(CEO Pay from Options) for the firm’s CEO, where the option value is calculated using the
Black-Scholes methodology of valuation. For robustness, I also examined the log value of
options; the impact on the hypothesized covariates was immaterial. The CEO pay and tenure data
come from the Compustat Executive Compensation database. Finally, because the threat of
acquisition is thought to discipline management (Manne, 1965), to account for the fact that some
firms face more active acquisition markets, I include a lagged count of mergers and acquisitions
(Industry Mergers) at the two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code level. These
data come from the Securities Data Company (SDC) Platinum database.
CEOs have strong incentives to report earnings that match or exceed those expected by
analysts, as missing an earnings target has negative consequences for the firm’s stock price and
CEO compensation (Skinner & Sloan, 2002). Though Picconi (2006) found that the ERR is set at
the beginning of the fiscal year typically, thus making pension assumptions an imperfect tool to
manage earnings, An et al. (2014) found evidence that firms do increase the ERR to make their
reported earnings meet or exceed analyst forecasts. To account for this possibility, I included two
control variables. The first is a binary indicator, Missed Earnings, which is equal to 1 when the
firm missed its earnings target for the year. This is calculated by subtracting the firm’s reported
earnings per share (EPS) from the median analyst forecast for the year.
The second indicator, Avoid Missed Earnings, is set to 1 when the firm met or exceeded
its earnings forecast but would not have had it not increased its ERR. Following the procedure
used by An et al. (2014), I calculated an adjusted EPS using the following formula:
𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑺𝑺′ = 𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬 − [(∆ 𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬 * FVPA * (1-MTR)] / # of common shares outstanding

where EPS is the reported earnings per share, ∆ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 is the change in the firm’s ERR from the

previous year, FVPA is the fair value of pension assets, and MTR is the marginal tax rate. This
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yields an estimate of the firm’s EPS had it not changed its ERR. I subtracted from this figure the
median analyst earnings estimate to determine whether the firm would have missed its estimate
had its ERR not changed. When a firm made its earnings estimate but would not have had the
ERR remained unchanged, Avoid Missed Earnings, was coded 1. The ERR and pension asset
data were taken from the Form 5500 and Compustat. The marginal tax rate data were taken from
Blouin et al. (2010), the EPS and common share data from Compustat, and the median analyst
forecast data from Thomson Reuters’ Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (IBES) database.
Additionally, I controlled for the possible effect of the retirement practices of industry
peers on a firm’s retirement policy by creating the variable Industry Average ERR. This figure
represents the average ERR among firms in my sample sharing the same two-digit SIC code. To
account for unobserved effects that may matter for a given year, I controlled for time using year
dummy codes. Descriptive statistics and correlations are presented in Table 1.
[--- Insert Table 1 about here ---]
Analytic Approach
In this study, the unit of analysis is the firm and the unit of observation is the firm year.
To examine the relationship between ERRs and the covariates, I used a pooled time-series
regression analysis with firm fixed effects. A fixed-effects model accounts for firms’ unobserved
characteristics that do not vary over time that may affect ERRs. This specification is achieved by
subtracting the values of each observation from the firm mean, removing all between-firm
differences, and leaving only within-firm variation to be explained by the covariates.
Specifically, I estimated the effects of the covariates on ERRs as follows:
𝒀𝒀𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 = 𝜷𝜷𝟎𝟎 + 𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏 𝑿𝑿𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 + … + 𝜷𝜷𝒑𝒑 𝑿𝑿𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑 + 𝜶𝜶𝒋𝒋 + 𝜺𝜺𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊

where all firm-specific effects are accommodated by αj and within-firm effects are explained by
the covariates. A fixed-effects framework strengthens the inferences about the effects the
covariates have on ERRs by ruling out the possibility that firms that adopted those rates had
stable unobserved preferences for their value. Furthermore, because fixed effects allow for the
23

correlation between αj and all Xij, whereas a random effect does not, under most conditions a
fixed effect is considered to be a more convincing estimation method (Wooldridge, 2006). A
Hausman test indicated that the fixed-effects model was appropriate (χ2 = 47.32, p < .01). Using
variance inflation factor tests, I found that multi-collinearity was not an issue.
RESULTS
The results of the fixed-effects regressions are in Table 2. Model 1 contains the results
for the independent variables. In Model 2, I included only the control variables. Model 3 shows
the results of the full model. Across models, several control variables are significantly related to
ERRs. ROE has a modestly significant and negative impact on ERR changes across models,
suggesting that when a firm’s financial performance wanes its executives increase the ERR. The
funding status of the plan is negatively related to ERRs at the .10 level in Model 2 but is
insignificant once the full model is specified. Shareholder rights are also negatively and
significantly related to ERRs, suggesting that as firms adopt mechanisms that curtail managerial
discretion, their ERRs decline. CEO tenure is positively and significantly related to ERRs,
suggesting that as executives gain experience and become more entrenched in their role, they are
more likely to increase the ERR. The results indicate that executives are significantly more likely
to increase the ERR when doing so allows the firm to avoid missing its earnings target. Finally,
firms in industries with higher ERRs in the previous year are also likely to increase their ERR.
[--- Insert Table 2 about here ---]
Because employees have an interest in ensuring their pension benefits remain stable and
secure, I predicted that employee power would be negatively associated with ERRs. Lending
support for Hypothesis 1, the results in Models 1 and 3 show a significant, negative relationship
between unionization and ERRs. I also ran analyses with a binary indicator as to whether the
firm has at least one collectively bargained plan, and those results were significant and negative
as well. It is important to note that for firms with at least one unionized plan, on average 45% of
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its DB participants are members of a collectively bargained plan. Therefore, the presence of a
collectively bargained plan in a firm helps participants in non-unionized DB plans.
Hypotheses 2a, b, and c predicted a positive relationship between equity ownership in the
previous year by bank trusts, public pension funds, and company pension funds, respectively,
and ERRs. Across models, the results indicate that the percentage of ownership by banks is
positively associated with ERR increases, lending credence to the argument that when a firm has
a higher percentage of its shares owned by investors with stronger fiduciary standards, its
executives seek to enhance current earnings performance by increasing the ERR. Hypothesis 2a
is therefore supported. Supporting Hypothesis 2b, the results also indicate a significant and
positive relationship for public pension fund ownership and ERRs. While consistent with the
theory that more stringent fiduciary standards motivate investors to prefer that firms report
higher near-term earnings—as such firms are deemed to be prudent investments—this finding
runs counter to previous work that argues that pension funds have a longer-term investment
horizon. I take up this point further in the discussion.
In contrast to the results from banks and public pension funds, in Model 1 there is a
negative and significant relationship between share ownership by company pension funds and
ERRs, which runs counter to Hypothesis 2c. However, once the full model is specified, the effect
is insignificant. While Hypothesis 2c is not supported, these results may suggest that, despite
their commensurate fiduciary responsibilities, company pension funds hold a more conservative
view toward earnings garnered from ERR increases than do banks or public pension funds. In
analyses from 1986 to 2006 without the CEO covariates, the effects for unionization and equity
ownership by bank trusts, public pension funds, and company pension funds are substantively
the same as those presented here.
Hypothesis 3 predicted that, compared to other CEOs, the presence of a CEO with a
finance background will be positively related to ERRs. Confirming this hypothesis, the results
support the argument that because finance CEOs have a preference to maximize short-term
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earnings and/or are more financially sophisticated, they are more willing to increase ERRs.
These findings reinforce those from other studies that suggest that finance CEOs make decisions
that favor shareholder welfare over that of other constituents (e.g., Budros, 2000; Jung, 2014).
Supplemental Analyses
In observational studies of this type, establishing causality between the covariates and the
dependent variable can present a significant challenge, and I am aware of concerns about
endogeneity affecting these results along with any inferences made about causality. I attempted
to deal with these concerns empirically using three different analyses: an error-correction model,
a two-stage least-squares analysis, and a triple-difference analysis.
Error-correction model. I first attempted to address endogeneity concerns using an
autoregressive analysis: the single-equation error-correction model (ECM). The single-equation
ECM used in the analyses is specified as follows:
∆𝒀𝒀𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕 = 𝜶𝜶𝟎𝟎 + 𝜶𝜶𝟏𝟏,𝒋𝒋 + 𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏 ∆𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕 − 𝜷𝜷𝟐𝟐 ∆𝜸𝜸,𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏 + 𝜷𝜷3 ∆𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏 + 𝜺𝜺𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕

where ∆Yt denotes the first difference of the dependent variable (Yt – Yt-1); α0 denotes the grand
mean; α1,j denotes firm-year deviation; β1 denotes the contemporaneous coefficient, which
absorbs any endogenous relationship between the explanatory covariate and the dependent
variable; β2 denotes the error correction rate of Y; and β3 denotes the impact of Xt-1 on ∆Yt. I
identified the relationship between the covariates and ERRs by estimating the effect of the
variables on future ERRs, holding the past ERRs and concurrent changes in the covariates
constant. Therefore, any concurrent endogenous association between the covariates and ERRs is
accounted for in β1, which is not used to identify the causal relation between the covariates and
ERRs. In these models, I included dummy codes for the two-digit SIC code of the focal firm.
Though I ran analyses on the full complement of controls, because of the large number of
variables in the ECM, I included only the results of the hypothesized covariates in Table 3. The
full model is available upon request. The results in Model 4 largely reinforce the fixed-effects
results with two important exceptions. Though the short-run impact of public pension fund
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ownership is positive and significant, the long-run effect of public pension fund ownership is not,
suggesting only a modest effect of public pension ownership on ERRs. Furthermore, consistent
with the findings from Model 1, the results also indicate a negative and significant long-run
effect between company pension fund ownership and ERRs. While I cannot completely rule out
concerns of endogeneity because the ECM takes into account the impact of past ERRs and
changes in the covariates, I am more confident that the relationships hypothesized here work in
the theorized direction and are not correlational or the result of reverse causality.
[--- Insert Table 3 about here ---]
Two-stage least-squares model. To attempt to address any concern that bank, public
pension fund, and company pension fund ownership shares are endogenous with the dependent
variable, I used a set of two-stage least-squares (2SLS) models with fixed effects. In a traditional
ordinary least-squares framework, there is a basic assumption that the error term is independent
of the predictor variables. 2SLS helps correct issues that arise when this assumption is violated.
In the first stage of the analysis, the endogenous regressor is regressed on the instrument variable
(IV) and the covariates, which isolates the variation in the predictor that is not correlated with the
error term. The fitted value from the first stage is then used in the second stage in place of the
endogenous regressor, allowing us to interpret the coefficient of the endogenous regressor as
“capturing a covariate-adjusted causal effect” (Bascle, 2008: 294; Wooldridge, 2006).
I used the number of Analysts covering a firm in the previous year as an IV for
institutional ownership. While the number of analysts covering a firm helps predict institutional
ownership (Cornett, Marcus, Saunders, & Tehranian, 2007), I do not expect it to be influenced
by firms’ pension policies. That is, I expect that analyst coverage will be correlated with share
ownership by bank trusts, public pension funds, and company pension funds, but the number of
analysts covering a firm should not be subject to reverse feedback from variations in a firm’s
ERR. Prior research has used the number of analysts as an IV to predict the impact of
institutional ownership on firm performance (Cornett et al., 2007) and opportunistic ERR
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increases (Eaton et al., 2014). One of the limitations here, however, is that I have three categories
of institutional investors but must use this IV for each type. Hence, I ran separate regressions
analyzing one investor type at a time with the number of stock analysts as the IV.
[--- Insert Table 4 about here ---]
The results of the 2SLS regressions appear in Models 5 through 7 in Table 4. As the
results indicate, the relationship between bank (Model 5) and public pension fund (Model 6)
share ownership remains positive and significant. However, in the second stage of these models,
the unionization and finance CEO variables are insignificant. Several other control variables that
were previously significant—including ROE, shareholder rights, CEO tenure, and—are also
insignificant in Model 6. It is possible that the lost efficiency inherent in these analyses has
affected the relationships between these other covariates and the dependent variable (Bascle,
2008). If so, a more strongly identified model would likely improve these results. 9 In Model 7,
the results for company pension fund ownership remain insignificant. Though the use of a single
instrument across the three models is not ideal, the results do offer some confirmation of the
previous findings regarding bank and public pension fund equity ownership.
Triple-differences analysis. Difference-in-difference (DD) approaches are a popular way
to estimate causal effects using observational data. They are particularly useful for estimating the
effects of policy interventions that do not affect all actors similarly. DD estimation compares the
differences in outcomes before and after a treatment (first difference) for groups affected by the
treatment to before-and-after outcomes of groups unaffected by it (second difference). In
December 2002, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued a warning that it might
challenge ERRs set above 9%. While the warning was issued to all firms, we should expect that
this intervention would have differentially affected firms’ willingness to lower their ERRs in the
9

I also included the annual average institutional holdings in the industry, excluding the focal firm, for each type of
institutional investor as a second IV. Prior research has documented a positive correlation between firm-level
institutional holdings and industry level institutional holdings (Choi & Sias, 2009; David et al., 2010), however, the
average level of institutional holdings in each firm’s industry is plausibly exogenous to the focal firm’s ERR. These
instruments, however, were not significant in the first-stage model.
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years following 2002 based on whether they had an ERR over 9% in 2002. As Figures 1 and 2
show, there was a marked decline after 2002 in the propensity for firms in my sample to maintain
an ERR over 9%, and the rate of decline in ERRs for firms with a high ERR was steeper. 10
[--- Insert Figure 1 about here ---]
[--- Insert Figure 2 about here ---]
To examine whether the relationships between the hypothesized covariates and ERRs
were sensitive to this change, I used a triple-differences (i.e., difference-in-difference-indifference) design. Specifically, I examined the difference in the observed relationship between
the bank ownership, public pension fund ownership, and finance CEOs (third differences,
respectively) on the one hand and ERRs on the other after the treatment (Post-SEC Warning) for
firms that had and did not have an ERR over 9% (High ERR) in 2002. 11 The results of the 2SLS
models are presented in Models 8 through 12 in Table 5.
[--- Insert Table 5 about here ---]
In Model 8, I regressed onto firms’ ERRs all control variables and a dummy code for the
post-SEC warning, a dummy variable indicating whether a firm had a high ERR in 2002, and an
interaction of these variables. As expected, the results indicate that after 2002, ERRs decreased
significantly and this effect was greater for firms that had a high ERR in 2002, indicating that the
policy had the effect of lowering ERRs, particularly in firms with high ERRs. In Model 9, I
included the triple difference by interacting rates of bank trust ownership with the high ERR and
10

There was a second significant policy change regarding pension assumptions in 2003. In that year, FASB issued
SFAS 132R, effective for firms with fiscal years ending after December 15, 2003, that required companies to
disclose how their pension assets were being invested across four broad investment classes (i.e., equities, bonds, real
estate, and other). I cannot rule out the possibility that the effects I show for the SEC warning are not due to firms
anticipating SFAS 132R or firms anticipated the SEC warning in 2001 or in early 2002. There are two potential
implications. First, if firms anticipated the SEC warning some time during 2001 or early 2002, there would be
measurement error in my proxies, thereby reducing the power of my tests. Second, I cannot differentiate the effect of
the SEC warning from SFAS 132R. Other studies have shown that SFAS 132R had an effect on ERR changes
beyond that of the SEC warning (e.g., Chuk, 2013). However, my goal is not to test the efficacy of a specific
intervention but instead examine how my covariates affect the willingness of firms to lower their ERRs in the wake
of a set of policy interventions designed to scrutinize more heavily firms’ pension accounting decisions.
11
I do not include results on unionization, as there were too few unionized firms in my sample with high ERRs in
2002. The results for unionization, which are available upon request, showed no significant effects.

29

post-SEC warning indicators. The positive and modestly significant coefficient suggests that for
firms with a high ERR in 2002, those with higher rates of bank ownership had a less pronounced
reaction to the SEC warning. Despite facing a strong incentive to lower their ERRs, firms with
higher rates of bank ownership lowered their ERRs to a lesser extent.
In Models 10 through 12, I repeat the same steps for public and company pension fund
share ownership and finance CEOs, respectively. In Model 10, there is a positive and significant
coefficient for the triple difference with public pension fund ownership, indicating that higher
rates of public pension fund ownership led firms with a high ERR in 2002 to respond less
aggressively to the SEC warning. In Model 11, the three-way interaction with company pension
fund ownership was not significant. However, the significant interaction between company
pension fund share ownership and the SEC warning indicates that as the percentage of a firm’s
equity owned by company pension plans increased, it was more likely to lower its ERR after the
SEC warning irrespective of having a high ERR in 2002. In Model 12, I tested the tripledifference for finance CEOs. I interacted the finance CEO, high ERR, and post-SEC warning
indicators. Similar to the results for bank trust and public pension fund ownership, firms with a
finance CEO and a high ERR in 2002 decreased their ERRs in subsequent years to a lesser
degree than did firms with a non-finance CEO.
Though this intervention is not a pure experiment, as a firm’s choice of ERR in 2002 was
not exogenous, it allowed me to examine whether institutional ownership and CEO background
differentially affected the response of firms with a high ERR in 2002 to the SEC warning. Taken
together, these results show that, despite a strong incentive to lower the ERR, executives did so
to a lesser degree when their firms had higher rates of ownership by bank trusts and public
pension funds and when they had a finance CEO, thereby providing additional insight on the
purported causal relationship between these variables and ERRs.
DISCUSSION
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In recent years, a major issue facing many corporations is paying for their past promises.
One salient example of this has occurred in the employment relationship, where promises of
lifetime employment and post-retirement income have slowly eroded due to factors like
technological advancement, globalization, and financial market pressures (Cappelli, 1999).
Despite these changing realities, however, many firms still confront these old commitments and
their concomitant financial obligations.
We see this dilemma clearly with DB pensions. A DB plan allows firms to remunerate
workers in the future for labor exerted in the present. For such plans to work, however, two
things are required. First, the worker must believe she will keep her job long enough to receive
the maximum return on the benefits. A pension plan, therefore, necessitates an implicit promise
of continued employment that incentivizes workers to accept a future benefit in lieu of wages in
the present (Lazear, 1986). Second, workers must believe that the money will be there when they
retire, which requires that firms have a means through which to pay for these distant benefits
with current contributions and the earnings on those contributions. The ERR is a key financial
technology that has given firms the ability to accomplish this second goal. Because the ERR is
sensitive to manipulation, firm stakeholders are incentivized to influence its value for their
advantage. The purpose of this study was to examine whether stakeholder power dynamics and
CEO decision-making schemas influenced how executives adjudicated between the demands of
two principals with conflicting interests as evidenced by firms’ ERRs on pension assets.
Drawing insights from socio-political theories of the firm, power-dependence
perspectives, stakeholder theory, and the literature on corporate governance, I argued that when
executives serve as agents to two principals with conflicting interests, power dynamics and
executives’ functional expertise influence which principal receives priority. The findings provide
support for most hypotheses, showing first that a firm’s level of unionization is negatively
associated with ERRs. Though the literature has traditionally overlooked the importance of labor
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in corporate governance (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003), the results here point to the key role
employee power plays in affecting corporate decision-making.
The results of most models examining the effect of bank trust and public pension fund
ownership showed each was positively associated with firms’ ERRs. Prior research has
substantiated that these institutional investors have strong incentives to invest in firms with better
current-earnings performance. This set of findings lends support for the claim that when
investors with higher fiduciary standards own a greater proportion of a firm’s equity, firm
executives seek ways to boost firm earnings by increasing ERRs. The result for public pensions
is particularly interesting given that such owners are often characterized as having a longer-term
investment horizon and as preferring firm strategies that consider broader stakeholder interests. It
is possible, therefore, that the depiction of public pension funds as having a long-term orientation
is inaccurate. Bushee (2004) found that, compared to banks, insurance companies, and
investment advisors, pension funds have the second highest percentage of short-term investors
(30%) and are tied for the lowest percentage of long-term investors (7%). His results suggest that
the categorization of public pension funds as holding a long-term orientation belies greater
complexity in their investment time horizons.
It is also possible that their longer-term orientation is limited to specific situations. Prior
studies substantiating that pension funds are patient capital have examined outcomes such as
corporate social responsibility (Johnson & Greening, 1999), international diversification
(Tihanyi et al., 2003), and innovation (Hoskisson et al., 2002), all of which represent relatively
fundamental changes to a firm’s strategy with an uncertain impact on future earnings. In
comparison, ERR changes are largely unrelated to the firm’s operational strategy and lead
directly to increased earnings in the present period. Firms and public pension fund managers may
see increasing ERRs as a relatively benign strategy that enhances near-term earnings, features
that make the firm a more prudent investment and potentially more appealing to such investors.
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My results also show that company pension fund ownership has no significant effect on
ERRs. Though one must exercise caution when attempting to draw inferences from null findings,
these results may suggest that, at least as it pertains to pension assumptions, other criteria than
short-term earnings maximization are considered by such investors. Finally, although agency
theory tends to treat agents’ interests as uniform, the results here point to the important role
played by executive background in affecting those interests. In particular, my findings support
the idea that the functional background of a firm’s CEO affects how conflicts between
stakeholders are resolved, as the interests of CEOs with a background in finance seem more
closely aligned with those of investors preferring better current-earnings performance.
This study contributes to organizational theory in two key ways. First, by combining
insights from socio-political, stakeholder, and power-dependence theories (Cyert & March,
1963; Mitchell et al., 1997; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), I present a fuller picture of the manifold
and often competing demands CEOs face and how these get resolved. Corporate governance
research normally highlights the tensions between shareholders and executives and the various
mechanisms used to align their interests. I sought to complement and extend this research by
analyzing the impact of stakeholder influence in a context where the interests of the three key
organizational stakeholders—employees, shareholders, and executives—were likely to conflict.
In particular, because DB pensions grant poorly defined property rights to workers, these
pensions are subject to ex post opportunism by executives (Shleifer & Summers, 1988). By
treating employees and shareholders as principals, differentiating shareholders by their fiduciary
responsibilities, and considering how the functional expertise of CEOs informs how they
adjudicate between employee and shareholder interests, I attempt to answer recent calls for
corporate governance research to attend to the complexity associated with managing multiple
stakeholders (Tihanyi, Graffin, & George, 2014).
Second and relatedly, a key challenge in researching how the differing interests of
employees and shareholders are resolved is identifying and examining firm-level contexts where
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these conflicts manifest. A handful of noteworthy studies have analyzed such conflicts by
studying outcomes such as managerial employment relationships and layoffs (e.g., Goldstein,
2012; Jung, 2014). By extending this work to the study of pension assumptions, I examined a
context in which the interests of investors with stronger fiduciary responsibilities and finance
CEOs are in conflict with those of workers, yet the conflict is largely unrelated to the operating
performance of the firm. To illustrate, we can take the study of layoffs. While the detrimental
impact of layoffs on affected workers is palpable, the logic undergirding that decision (even if
proven inaccurate) is typically to make the firm more efficient and profitable (Hallock, 2009).
Hence, it is difficult to separate the operational impetus for layoffs from their impact on the
workforce. Aggressive ERRs, on the other hand, effectively transfer money that would have
gone into the retirement plan into firm earnings yet are largely disconnected from the firm’s
operating performance. Though I cannot discern an executive’s intentions behind changing the
firm’s ERR, the distinction between operational and financial decisions is important because it
eliminates some of the confounding factors that might explain an executive’s decision to
privilege the interests of one stakeholder group over another.
Additionally, this study complements and extends recent research on DB plan
participation. Cobb (2015) found that the desire to reduce the financial uncertainty of DB
arrangements was a major factor in firms’ decisions to decrease the size of their plans. Largescale surveys have suggested that firms’ desire to amend their retirement plans is primarily in
response to concerns over the volatility of plan costs (Hewitt Associates, 2003; Towers Watson,
2010; U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2008). In this study, I show that employee power,
equity ownership structures, and CEO backgrounds help create that uncertainty (Waring, 2012).
That is, when the ERR is greater than the actual rate of return, the firm must make up for this
shortfall over time with increased contributions. Because higher ERRs make future pension costs
more uncertain, this study suggests that stakeholder conflict helps establish the conditions under
which firms are motivated to eventually shrink the size of their DB plans.
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This study also contributes to the broader literature on ERRs as an earnings management
tool. Prior research on this topic has largely focused on executives’ incentives for amending the
rate. In this study, I argue and find support for the claim that employee and shareholder interests,
as well as the decision-making schemas of CEOs, are also factors that influence the rate at which
a firm sets its ERR. In so doing, this study has implications for policy. Company pension funds
hold trillions of dollars in investments and millions of workers currently or in the future will rely
on these funds as a key source of post-retirement income. Given the increasing problems faced
within the DB pension system in the United States, it is beneficial to know which factors are
associated with better or worse management and funding of these plans (Eaton et al., 2014).
Limitations and Future Directions
One limitation is that I do not have data on other employment rewards such as wages and
other fringe benefits. Therefore, it is possible that as firms increase their ERRs, the proceeds are
used to remunerate workers in other ways, such as increasing wages or paying for rising health
insurance premiums. There is no evidence from the literature on DB plan terminations and
freezes that suggests that the altering of firm retirement plans led to greater worker remuneration.
Though the compensating differential rationale for ERR increases seems unlikely, I cannot rule it
out. Future empirical research can exploit large-scale, matched firm-employee data or singlefirm studies with data on wages and bundles of benefits to determine whether changes to one
form of remuneration are met with changes to others.
Second, while a common issue in observational studies of this type, the influence of
unionization, equity ownership, and CEO background cannot be assessed directly. Though the
patterns in the data largely support the theoretical claims made herein, there are limits on how
much information one can infer from these results. Furthermore, though the supplemental
analyses help address concerns with endogeneity, they cannot completely rule it out. In the
future, researchers can exploit different methodologies such as interviews, ethnographies, and
single-firm studies to better elucidate the mechanisms I hypothesized to be driving these results.
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In a similar vein, there is no way to discern the intent behind ERR increases, and it is
possible that executives changed the rate for reasons other than to boost earnings. For instance, a
CEO could be overly optimistic and believe the firm can outperform historical market returns.
Unless these other rationales for increasing the ERR are correlated with my independent
variables (e.g., finance CEOs are more optimistic), finding significant results should be more
difficult. While I cannot claim with complete certainty that some ERR increases were not
motivated by other factors, the effect of an ERR change on pension expenditures and firm
earnings is the same irrespective of intent. It also seems reasonable to assume that regardless of
motive, executives are aware of the impact that ERR changes have on firm earnings.
CONCLUSION
One of the primary features of the employment relationship is that it involves the
exchange of labor in return for various forms of remuneration. Beginning in earnest after World
War II, firms began rewarding workers with deferred compensation, whereby firms set aside
funds for the workers’ future with a promise of a lifetime wage in post-retirement for work done
in the present period. The promises that undergird this relationship have been increasingly
challenged, as these obligations have proved burdensome to many organizations. As the ability
of shareholders to influence corporate decision-making increased (Useem, 1993) and the ability
of employees to do so waned (Western & Rosenfeld, 2011), executives increasingly have found
ways to deal with those problematic obligations in ways that tend to disadvantage employees.
In this study, I examined the factors motivating firms to alter the return assumptions of
their pension plans as a way to boost earnings in the present period and shift worker obligations
further into the future. By considering how firms react to demands from their employees and
investors, as well as how a CEO’s background affects employment outcomes, the research
presented here suggests an important role for organizational theory in linking changes in the
corporate power structure to practices that directly affect worker and societal welfare.
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Figure 1. Distribution of ERRs by year
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Figure 2. Average ERR, 1999 to 2006
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix, 1992-2006
Variables
1 Expected rate of retrurn (00s)
2 Unionization (%)
3 Bank ownershipt-1 (%)
4 Public pension ownershipt-1 (%)
5 Company pension ownershipt-1 (%)
6 Insurance co ownershipt-1 (%)
7 Investment advisor ownershipt-1 (%)
8 CEO Finance
9 Total assetst-1 (log)
10 Revenue growth (%)
11 Return on equityt-1 (%)
12 Debt-to-assets ratiot-1 (%)
13 DB assets (log)
14 Funding status (%)
15 Shareholder rights
16 CEO tenure
17 CEO pay from options (%)
18 Industry Mergerst-1
19 Missed earnings
20 Avoid missed earnings
21 Industry average ERRt-1 (%)
Variables
12 Debt-to-assets ratiot-1 (%)
13 DB assets (log)
14 Funding status (%)
15 Shareholder rights
16 CEO tenure
17 CEO pay from options (%)
18 Industry Mergerst-1
19 Missed earnings
20 Avoid missed earnings
21 Industry average ERRt-1 (%)

Mean
890.71
0.15
13.64
3.15
0.68
5.14
35.84
0.30
8.47
0.01
11.78
22.76
19.55
104.90
14.04
5.29
28.13
6.13
0.44
0.03
8.97

S.D.
82.81
0.30
6.86
1.89
1.14
4.61
16.19
0.46
1.54
0.03
31.62
15.63
1.83
30.59
2.63
6.38
25.05
7.60
0.50
0.17
0.43

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

1
-0.01
0.00
0.09
0.05
0.05
-0.05
-0.01
-0.01
-0.03
0.00
0.06
0.11
0.17
-0.05
-0.02
0.14
0.00
0.01
0.07
0.34

1
-0.06
0.00
0.01
-0.05
-0.06
-0.02
-0.11
-0.01
-0.02
0.12
0.03
0.00
0.02
-0.03
-0.03
-0.03
0.01
0.04
0.05

1
0.25
0.10
0.05
0.12
-0.04
0.25
0.03
0.07
-0.18
0.26
0.00
-0.14
0.01
0.09
0.05
-0.10
0.00
-0.07

1
0.12
0.10
0.18
-0.03
0.05
0.00
-0.03
-0.09
0.08
0.02
-0.15
0.04
-0.01
-0.06
-0.02
-0.01
0.06

1
0.05
0.04
0.00
0.10
0.00
0.01
-0.05
0.06
0.04
-0.05
0.03
0.04
0.01
-0.04
-0.01
0.06

1
0.12
-0.02
0.07
0.04
0.00
-0.05
0.03
-0.01
0.01
-0.02
0.11
0.00
-0.04
-0.03
0.05

1
-0.05
-0.03
0.06
-0.03
0.06
-0.03
-0.21
-0.15
-0.04
0.13
-0.02
0.03
-0.05
-0.11

1
0.24
0.01
0.01
-0.07
0.01
0.05
-0.03
-0.05
0.01
0.10
-0.01
0.01
-0.03

1
0.00
0.02
-0.16
0.59
0.00
0.08
0.00
0.11
0.29
-0.03
0.00
-0.19

1
0.02
-0.01
-0.08
-0.02
0.01
0.03
0.01
0.03
-0.14
0.02
-0.07

1
-0.08
0.03
0.01
0.00
0.01
0.03
0.04
-0.06
0.01
-0.01

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

1
-0.06
-0.09
0.03
-0.01
-0.09
-0.06
0.13
0.00
0.06

1
0.13
-0.01
-0.10
0.08
0.20
0.03
0.06
-0.06

1
-0.03
0.03
0.00
0.09
-0.01
0.06
0.27

1
0.05
-0.05
-0.01
0.02
0.02
-0.03

1
-0.08
-0.02
-0.03
-0.03
0.03

1
0.14
0.05
-0.02
0.18

1
0.02
0.01
-0.03

1
-0.15
0.06

1
0.02
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Table 2. Fixed-effects regression on ERRs on pension assets, 1992-2006
Variables
Unionization (%)
Bank ownershipt-1 (%)
Public pension ownershipt-1 (%)
Company pension ownershipt-1 (%)
Insurance co ownershipt-1 (%)
Investment advisor ownershipt-1 (%)
CEO Finance

M1
-24.182**
(8.192)
0.319+
(0.163)
1.741***
(0.489)
-1.632*
(0.780)
-0.145
(0.249)
0.145+
(0.078)
4.121+
(2.307)

M2

3.362
(2.287)
-15.928
Revenue growth (%)
(30.873)
-0.048+
Return on equityt-1 (%)
(0.025)
0.031
Debt-to-assets ratiot-1 (%)
(0.095)
-1.083
DB assets (log)
(1.531)
0.074+
Funding status (%)
(0.043)
-4.364***
Shareholder rights
(0.793)
0.443**
CEO tenure
(0.159)
0.016
CEO pay from options (%)
(0.037)
0.118
Industry mergerst-1
(0.142)
1.960
Missed earnings
(1.654)
23.045***
Avoid missed earnings
(3.796)
11.495***
Industry average ERRt-1 (%)
(3.231)
915.984*** 983.859***
Constant
(2.602)
(12.062)
Observations
6,803
5,619
Firms
708
658
Year dummies
Yes
Yes
R-squared
0.31
0.33
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10. Tests are two-tailed
Standard errors in parentheses
Total assetst-1 (log)
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M3
-24.123**
(9.254)
0.472*
(0.185)
0.936*
(0.470)
-1.179
(0.835)
0.166
(0.286)
0.099
(0.095)
5.442*
(2.535)
3.495
(2.319)
-23.383
(30.898)
-0.048+
(0.025)
0.040
(0.095)
-1.191
(1.533)
0.066
(0.043)
-3.992***
(0.804)
0.448**
(0.159)
0.014
(0.037)
0.093
(0.143)
2.032
(1.657)
23.096***
(3.793)
10.970***
(3.234)
975.188***
(12.326)
5,610
658
Yes
0.36

Table 3. Error correction regression model on ERRs on pension assets, 1993-2006

Variables
Unionization (%)
∆ Unionization (%)
Bank ownership (%)
∆ Bank ownership (%)
Public pension ownership (%)
∆ Public pension ownership (%)
Company pension ownership (%)
∆ Company pension ownership (%)
CEO Finance

M4
Coefficient
-20.358***

St Error
(1.954)

-33.909***

(8.985)

0.695***
0.775***
0.489***
1.749***

(0.102)
(0.163)
(0.367)
(0.526)

-2.639***

(0.483)

-2.432***

(0.473)

3.608***

(1.353)

∆ CEO Finance
Constant

19.606***
(2.782)
997.012***
(33.784)
Observations
5,772
Adjusted R-squared
0.770
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10. Tests are two-tailed
Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses
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Table 4. Two-stage least squares regression on ERRs on pension assets, 1992-2006
Variables
Unionization (%)
Analystst-1
Bank ownershipt-1 (%)

M5
-13.199
(13.596)
0.106***
(0.169)
6.565*
(2.773)

M6
-1.960
(17.597)
First stage
0.025***
(0.005)

M7
-51.925**
(19.347)
0.013**
(0.004)

27.649*
(12.513)

Public pension ownershipt-1 (%)
Company pension ownershipt-1 (%)

3.465
2.477
(3.142)
(3.784)
-0.748
-6.397
Total assetst-1 (log)
(3.227)
(5.090)
-11.141
-53.465
Revenue growth (%)
(38.445)
(38.371)
-0.049+
-0.000
Return on equityt-1 (%)
(0.028)
(0.040)
0.225
-0.089
Debt-to-assets ratiot-1 (%)
(0.146)
(0.131)
-4.293*
0.070
DB assets (log)
(2.173)
(2.248)
0.049
0.046
Funding status (%)
(0.067)
(0.076)
-2.996*
-1.560
Shareholder rights
(1.313)
(1.759)
0.234
0.198
CEO tenure
(0.194)
(0.220)
-0.003
0.034
CEO pay from options (%)
(0.046)
(0.049)
0.007
-0.111
Industry Mergerst-1
(0.149)
(0.191)
0.211
0.373
Missed earnings
(2.079)
(2.301)
24.770***
25.245***
Avoid missed earnings
(4.457)
(4.715)
10.436*
10.289*
Industry average ERRt-1 (%)
(4.453)
(4.633)
Observations
5,554
5,550
Firms
628
628
Year dummies
Yes
Yes
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10. Tests are two-tailed
Standard errors in parentheses
CEO Finance
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21.127
(25.246)
15.208*
(6.073)
-4.677
(5.224)
-22.564
(40.054)
-0.084*
(0.037)
-0.129
(0.160)
-1.950
(2.089)
0.113
(0.092)
-3.256*
(1.417)
0.131
(0.274)
-0.012
(0.053)
-0.593
(0.481)
1.053
(2.317)
19.481***
(4.636)
12.254*
(5.284)
5,550
628
Yes

Table 5. Triple-difference regression on ERRs on pension assets, 1992-2006
Variables
Post-SEC Warning
High ERR
High ERR x Post-SEC warning

M8
-85.696***
(6.295)
-22.349+
(13.116)
-20.891***
(3.446)

Unionization (%)
Bank ownershipt-1 (%)
Bank ownership x High ERR
Bank ownership x Post-SEC warning
Bank ownership x High ERR x Post-SEC warning
Public pension ownershipt-1 (%)

M9
-86.493***
(6.717)
-20.777
(13.175)
-20.898***
(4.153)
-25.176**
(9.219)
1.156***
(0.235)
-1.446**
(0.439)
-1.584***
(0.350)
1.017+
(0.555)
1.179*
(0.577)

M10
-87.915***
(6.710)
-21.516
(13.205)
-26.727***
(4.245)
-26.426**
(9.243)
0.423*
(0.185)

M11
-95.551***
(6.719)
-23.843+
(13.116)
-18.597***
(4.200)
-18.562*
(9.251)
0.375*
(0.183)

M12
-89.565***
(6.817)
-18.617
(13.319)
-26.027***
(4.243)
-25.743**
(9.231)
0.405*
(0.184)

1.152*
(0.575)

1.032+
(0.577)

-1.253
(0.829)

1.324+
(0.676)
-0.942
(1.230)
-2.741
(2.115)
9.558*
(3.839)
-1.298
(0.832)

-1.267
(0.831)

4.991*
(2.513)

5.154*
(2.521)

0.042
(0.939)
0.259
(2.173)
-15.708***
(2.454)
4.942
(5.388)
4.622+
(2.511)

979.852***
(12.640)
5,597
658
Yes
0.362

978.847***
(12.588)
5,597
658
Yes
0.367

Public pension ownership x High ERR
Public pension ownership x Post-SEC warning
Public pension ownership x High ERR x PostSEC warning
Company pension ownershipt-1 (%)
Company pension ownership x High ERR
Company pension ownership x Post-SEC warning
Company pension ownership x High ERR x PostSEC warning
CEO Finance
CEO Finance x High ERR
CEO Finance x Post-SEC warning
CEO Finance x High ERR x Post-SEC warning
987.642*** 976.545***
(12.384)
(12.626)
Observations
5,606
5,597
Firms
658
658
Year dummies
Yes
Yes
R-squared
0.357
0.365
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10. Tests are two-tailed
Standard errors in parentheses
Constant

43

5.001
(3.278)
-4.593
(6.224)
-1.221
(4.338)
16.852*
(7.756)
978.905***
(12.675)
5,597
658
Yes
0.362
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